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Abstract 
Experimental evidence from both the lab and the field shows that women on average have a lower propensity to 
enter a competitive environment. In this paper, we investigate gender differences in competitiveness using a lab-
in-the-field experiment and a subject pool consisting of Chinese adults. China provides an interesting environment 
to study in this regard since the country has promoted gender equality for a long time and the gender gap in earnings 
is small in a cross-country comparison. However, in many respects, China is still a patriarchal society. Our 
experimental results show that women perform equally well as men in a piece-rate task and significantly better in 
a competitive payment environment. Despite this, men are more than twice as likely to voluntarily choose a 
competitive environment. This gender difference cannot be explained by differences in risk preferences or 
overconfidence.  
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1. Introduction 
Gender differences in competitiveness have been widely documented in many contexts and 
across countries (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2008; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). They have been put 
forward as a key factor explaining observed gender differences especially in educational and 
occupational choices and wages (Buser et al., 2014; Jurajda and Münich, 2011; 
Kleinjans,2009). Investigating gender differences in educational and occupational choices 
using naturally occurring data is challenging, since it is difficult to establish causal effects of 
gender on competitive choices. As a result, experimental methods have been developed. There 
is by now a large experimental literature documenting gender differences in willingness to 
compete, building on the pioneering experimental work by Gneezy et al. (2003) and Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007). A key finding from these experiments is that women are less likely to 
compete, while men often compete in situations where they should not (e.g., Dargnies, 2012; 
Datta Gupta et al., 2013; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007 and 2011; Niederle et al., 2013; Sutter 
and Rützler, 2014). These findings are robust to alternative explanations including differences 
in abilities, risk preferences, and overconfidence, although the extent of the differences varies 
both among studies (Buser et al., 2014; Kamas and Preston, 2012; Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2010) and across contexts and cultures. For example, in Healy and Pate (2011), the difference 
in competitiveness between men and women is drastically reduced if the competition is between 
teams and not individuals, while Gneezy et al. (2009) found that women were more willing to 
compete in a matrilineal society in India than in an extremely patriarchal society in Tanzania.  
 
This paper provides experimental evidence on the willingness to compete among adult men and 
women in China. In particular, we use an adult subject pool in three different cities located in 
different provinces. China provides a particularly interesting case for studies of gender 
differences in competitiveness. First, the country has long promoted gender equality and has 
traditionally had a small gender gap in earnings in an international perspective. Women in 
China have also participated in the labor market to a greater extent than women in most other 
countries. Already in the 1950s, the Chinese government worked actively to enable the Han 
Chinese women to work outside the household (Croll, 1983). All workers were assigned to jobs, 
and wages were centrally regulated. At the same time, the policy of equal pay for equal work 
was implemented and women had almost the same number of working hours as men 
(Gustafsson and Li, 2000). The female labor force participation has exceeded 80% for a long 
time. China was also one of the first countries to ratify the United Nations International 
Convention to eliminate all kinds of discrimination against women (CEDAW). Although a 
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gender wage gap have existed, it was rather small in an international comparison (Gustafsson 
and Li, 2000). 1  Second, an educational reform consisting of an expansion policy was 
implemented in 1999 (Che and Zhang, 2018). As a result of the reform, the education level of 
Chinese women have increased dramatically in both rural and urban areas (Attané, 2012).2 
Third, sons have traditionally been preferred over daughters due to the patriarchal family 
structure in China, with potentially negative effects on Chinese women´s willingness to 
compete. This gender preference was further strengthened by the one-child policy introduced 
in 1979 (Das Gupta et al., 2010). Fourth, Chinese women´s work situation has changed since 
the beginning of this century as the number of state-owned companies, which typically offer an 
employment-for-life guarantee, has decreased. Thus, unemployment has started to rise among 
women, and especially among older women decreased (Maurer-Fazio et al., 2011).  
 
Most of the previous studies on gender differences in competitiveness have focused on 
university students (Datta Gupta et al., 2013; Gneezy et al., 2003; Healy and Pate, 2011; 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2013), although some have been conducted 
using adults from the general population (Gneezy et al., 2009; Reuben et al., 2015) or children 
and adolescents (Booth and Nolen, 2012; Cardenas et al., 2012; Sutter and Rützler, 2010 and 
2014). Moreover, almost all of these have been conducted in Western societies, leading to very 
little evidence regarding cultural differences. Notable exceptions include Gneezy et al. (2009) 
and Zhang (2018). Gneezy et al. (2009) found a much higher willingness to compete among 
women in a matrilineal society in India, but an opposite pattern in an extremely patriarchal 
society in Tanzania, indicating social learning effects depending on whether an environment is 
male or female dominated.3 Zhang (2018) conducted an experiment on competitiveness among 
high school students from two patrilineal ethnic groups in China (Han Chinese and Yi) and 
found no gender gap among Han students but a significant difference between men and women 
among Yi students. According to Zhang (2018), one possible explanation for this difference is 
that although traditionally both Han Chinese and Yi societies have been characterized by male-
dominated norms, as mentioned, these norms became weaker among Han Chinese due to the 
many reforms by the Communist Party starting already in the 1950s. Among other things, a 
                                                        
1 The total gender wage gap was 15.5 % in 1988 and 17.5 % in 1995, but lower among the youngest and more 
educated women (Gustafsson and Li, 2000). 
2 Before the reform, women had a clearly lower average level of education than men (Gustafsson and Li, 2000).  
3 These results are in line with the findings by Booth and Nolen (2012). Although their subjects were students in 
the UK, their results also emphasized contextual effects explaining differences between genders: Girls from single-
sex schools behaved more like boys, i.e. they behaved more competitively than girls from coed schools. 
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large share of Han Chinese women joined the labor force around this time, strengthening 
women´s position in the society. Ethnic groups such as Yi were excluded from this labor reform 
and therefore remained more patriarchal.4  
 
In this paper, we investigate whether there are gender differences in competitiveness among 
adult Han Chinese. Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we conducted a lab-in-the-field 
experiment as part of a large survey with several experiment.  We did this in three cities in three 
provinces located in different parts of China. In contrast to most previous studies showing no 
gender differences in performance between the genders, our results show that women on 
average performed equally well or better thans males . Moreover, while both genders improved 
their performance under competition, this effect was stronger among women than men. Despite 
this, and after controlling for both expectations about performance in the tournament and risk 
preferences, we find that men are substantially more likely to choose to compete. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
 
2.1. Experimental design  
The competition experiment was based on the experimental design developed by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007). Subjects completed three tasks, but only one was randomly selected as 
payoff relevant. Each subject was randomly matched with three other participants to form a 
group of four people, but they did not know who the other group members were. The group 
composition was the same during the whole experiment, and in each group, two members were 
men and two were women.5 Subjects faced the task of calculating the sum of five randomly 
chosen two-digit numbers. Subjects were not allowed to use a calculator but could write the 
numbers down using a pen and scratch paper that we provided. To familiarize them with the 
task, they completed a one-minute trial round. After that, the first part of the experiment began.  
 
For Task 1 – piece rate payment – the subjects were asked to calculate the sum of five randomly 
chosen two-digit numbers and write the answers on an answer sheet. The time provided for this 
                                                        
4 Zhang (2018) also studied one matrilineal society (Mosou) and found Mosou men to be more competitive than 
Mosou women, despite the fact that the Mosou society is matrilineal. She argues that a possible reason for the 
result is that Mosous are a polygamous ethnic group. 
5 All subjects were invited back to the community or university office, where they were asked to draw a piece of 
paper from a box. To ensure there were two men and two women in each group, male and female subjects were 
asked to draw a paper from two separate boxes where each paper had a letter between A and Z. Two men and two 
women who drew the same letter were placed in the same group. They then separately drew a second piece of 
paper with a number from 1-3 on it to decide which task would determine their payment. 
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task was three minutes. The payment was 3 yuan per problem solved if the task was randomly 
selected for payment. In Task 2 – tournament – subjects again had three minutes to solve the 
same type of math problems. However, now the payment depended on the performance relative 
to that of the other group members. The group member who solved the largest number of 
problems received 12 yuan per correct solution while the other participants received no 
payment. In case of a tie, the ranking of the group members with equal performance was 
randomly determined. In Task 3 – choice between piece rate and tournament – the subjects first 
had to choose payment schedule – piece rate or tournament – and then again solve the same 
type of math problems for three minutes. If a subject chose piece rate, the payment was again 
3 yuan per correct response. If a subject chose tournament, the performance was evaluated 
relative to the performance of the other three group members in Task 2. If the subject solved 
more problems than any of the other three group members, the payment was 12 yuan per correct 
response. Finally, the subjects guessed their rank relative to other group members in Tasks 1 
and 2. For each correct guess, they earned 3 yuan.  
 
We also use the results from an incentive-compatible risk experiment to investigate how risk 
preferences affect the decision to enter a competitive situation. Risk preferences were elicited 
from three different lotteries with probabilities of winning of 10%, 50%, and 90%, respectively. 
We used a choice list for each lottery, where subjects chose between a safe amount and a lottery 
with a certain probability of winning a fixed amount (e.g., Sutter et al., 2013). For each new 
row on the choice list, the safe amount was increased. We measure risk attitudes based on the 
choice when a subject switched from choosing the lottery to choosing a sure amount, which 
allows us to calculate the corresponding certainty equivalent (see Carlsson et al. (2018) for 
details).  
 
2.2. Recruitment and experimental procedure 
We conducted our study in three cities, namely Guilin (located in southern China), Wuxi 
(located in eastern China), and Lanzhou (located in western China), in 2014. Table 1 
summarizes the basic characteristics of these three cities. Wuxi is the more developed city with 
a higher GDP per capita.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of the three sampled cities. 
Variable  Guilin Wuxi Lanzhou 
City area (km2)a  565 1643 1574 
City resident populationb (person)  1,507,200 3,613,800 2,659,700 
GDP per capita (yuan)  34,859 126,389 54,771 
Disposable annual income per capita 
(yuan) 
 
26,811 41,731 23,030 
Average annual salary (yuan)  45,194 68,187 51,928 
Source: The data is from 2015 statistics yearbooks at both city and provincial levels.  
a The total area of the city´s main districts. 
b Permanent residents who live in the city´s main districts. 
 
The experiments used in this paper are part of a large study on the Chinese one-child policy 
(see Carlsson et al., 2018).6 The subjects included in the study had to meet the following 
requirements: (i) born in 1976–1986 in the sampled city, (ii) parents were born in the city (had 
urban Hukou) , and (iii) parents belonged to the Han majority.7 The third criterion ensures that 
the subjects and their parents had been exposed to the many reforms implemented by the 
Communist Party starting already in the 1950. All subjects were selected from the community 
registration system. Community coordinators8 helped us make a first random selection based 
on the three conditions. We then contacted potential subjects by phone and re-checked that they 
did meet our three eligibility requirements. Only eligible subjects were invited to participate in 
the experiments and survey. The sample was balanced on both birth year and gender.  
 
Once subjects arrived at the community or university office, they were interviewed in a separate 
room by one experimenter. First, the eligibility of the subject was once again checked, and then 
the whole study was introduced. All subjects participated in five different experiments: 
competition, risk and ambiguity preferences, time preferences, a public good game, and an 
ultimatum game experiment. In addition to the experiments, the subjects were asked to 
complete a questionnaire. They were promised a show-up fee of 50 yuan and possibly additional 
payments from the experiments. In each of the three cities, ten graduate students from the local 
university were employed as experimenters and trained to conduct the survey.  
 
                                                        
6 The current paper uses a somewhat larger sample size since we do not rely on strict exclusion restrictions based 
on the one-child policy. Furthermore, in Carlsson et al. (2018), the focus was on the one-child policy and not on 
gender differences. 
7 Hukou is the Chinese household registration system. Since we wanted to focus on subjects born in cities, we had 
to make sure that both of the subject´s parents had a city Hukou. 
8 The community coordinators worked at the community office and were more familiar with the residents than we 
were. They helped introduce our survey to the potential eligible subjects, and thus increased their trust in our 
survey.  
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In each experiment, the experimenter read the instructions out loud before the subjects were 
allowed to make the decisions. No feedback or information about the outcome was given 
between experiments. This was followed by a questionnaire survey that included questions 
about the individual and their household characteristics, attitudes, social capital, trust in socieyt, 
risk attitudes, and happiness. Then the subjects were paid a show-up fee of 50 yuan together 
with any earnings from risk and ambiguity experiment uncertainty and the time preference 
experiment.9 As the other three experiments involved interaction with others, all subjects were 
asked to come back on a later day for payment, since their payments depended on what 
decisions others had made.The experiments were always conducted in the same order, and 
hence the competition experiment was always conducted first, followed by the risk experiment. 
The whole session lasted for about 1.5 hours.  
 
A total of 856 subjects participated in the experiments. We drop two subjects with the wrong 
birth years, and thus 854 subjects (428 men and 426 women) are left for our analyses: 407 in 
Guilin, 200 in Wuxi, and 247 in Lanzhou. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the whole 
sample by gender. There are no statistically significant differences between men and women 
for most of the individual and household characteristics. However, on average, men are more 
likely to be an only-child and have higher income than women. Compared with men, a larger 
proportion of women are married and have children.  
 
  
                                                        
9 In the case of time preferences, subjects received their payments on the same day only if they had chosen payment 
today; otherwise the money was transferred to their bank accounts on a specific date. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by gender. 
Variable Description Men Women 
H0: No difference 
between gender (p-
value) 
Age Age in years 
32.85 
(3.166) 
33.14 
(3.275) 
0.194 
Education Years of education 
15.10 
(2.275) 
15.25 
(1.999) 
0.911 
Public sector =1 if work in the public sector 
0.49 
(0.500) 
0.53 
(0.500) 
0.273 
Collective sector =1 if work in the collective sector 
0.12 
(0.324) 
0.13 
(0.338) 
0.587 
Only child = 1 if no siblings 
0.76 
(0.431) 
0.68 
(0.469) 
0.011 
Number siblings 
No. of siblings if subject has 
siblings 
1.29 
(0.532) 
1.25 
(0.593) 
0.369 
Married = 1 if married 
0.75 
(0.436) 
0.82 
(0.389) 
0.015 
Have children = 1 if subject has at least one child 
0.61 
(0.489) 
0.72 
(0.451) 
<0.000 
Number of 
children 
No. of children if subject has 
children 
1.04 
(0.202) 
1.03 
(0.160) 
0.292 
Income 
Own annual income in 10,000 
yuan 
5.96 
(6.770) 
3.60 
(3.054) 
0.000 
Household income 
Annual household income in 
10,000 yuan 
13.17 
(11.966) 
12.85 
(11.521) 
0.132 
Parent university 
educated 
= 1 if at least one parent has 
university degree 
0.25 
(0.44) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.357 
No. of obs.  428 426  
Note: The figures in the parentheses are standard deviations. Tests are Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and proportion 
tests.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Piece rate and tournament 
Table 3 summarizes the average performance by men and women in the piece-rate and 
tournament tasks (Tasks 1 and 2). In Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix, we also present the 
distribution of number of correctly solved problems by gender in the piece-rate and tournament 
tasks. In the piece-rate task women solved on average 9.6 problems correctly, while men solved 
9.2. Using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, this difference between genders is insignificant at 
conventional levels (p-value=0.054).10 For the tournament, women on average correctly solved 
10.4 problems and men 9.7, and this difference is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Thus, 
our results indicate that women are slightly better than men at solving problems, which 
contradicts what many other previous studies have found, including the original study Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007) as well as Niederle et al. (2013) and Zhang (2018). 
  
                                                        
10 Throughout the paper, we use a Wilcoxon rank sum test for the gender difference tests, unless otherwise noted.  
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In addition, there was an increase in performance from piece rate to tournament for both 
genders. More specifically, women and men increased their number of correctly solved 
problems by 0.76 and 0.49,  respectively (Wilcoxon signed rank test; p-value < 0.001 for both 
women and men). Admittedly, this increase could be caused by learning effects or the different 
incentive environments under piece rate and tournament (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). 
Interestingly, however, the increase in performance is statistically significantly larger among 
females than males (p-value=0.020). This result is not in line with what others have found. For 
example, Gneezy et al. (2003) found that men increased their performance in a tournament, 
while women did not, and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) found that boys improved their 
performance in a competitive situation, while girls did not.11 Furthermore, in our study out of 
the 214 randomly created groups, women were the best performer in 120 and men in 96.12 Thus, 
in our sample, women have a somewhat higher probability of winning than men.  
Table 3. The average performance by gender in the piece-rate and tournament tasks 
 
Men Women 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test (p-value) 
Piece rate 
9.16 
(3.31) 
9.61 
(3.46) 
0.054 
Tournament 
9.65 
(3.21) 
10.38 
(3.56) 
0.005 
Difference 
0.49 
(2.22) 
0.76 
(2.33) 
0.023 
No. of obs. 428 426  
 Note: The numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations.  
 
4.2 Tournament entry  
Since we find that women are better than men at solving the math problems in a competitive 
situation (the tournament task), one would perhaps expect women to be more likely to choose 
tournament in Task 3. However, only 19.7 % of the women chose to enter the tournament in 
Task 3, whereas the corresponding proportion for men is 42.8 %, i.e., men were more than twice 
as likely as women to choose competition. The difference is statistically significant (proportion 
test; p-value < 0.001). Our results are in line with the results by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), 
who found that twice as many men as women chose the competitive alternative. Our results are 
very different from those presented by Zhang (2018), who found no gender differences in 
competitiveness among Han Chinese subjects. However, Zhang (2018) used high school 
                                                        
11 In Table A1 in appendix we also report the results separately for each province. We find that women outperform 
men in all provinces, and also that they improve their performance more under competition than men. However, 
most gender differences are not statistically significant at the 5 % significance level. 
12 The actual ranks include the cases of ties.  
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students as subjects, while we used an adult non-student subject pool. Thus, it is difficult to 
directly compare the results of the two studies. There could be effects related to the age of the 
subjects. For example, Garratt et al. (2013) find that older individuals are less willing to 
compete. Yet, in Mayr et al. (2012), the willingness to compete changed across the life span 
and peaked at around age 50.  
 
Table 4 presents the average performance for subjects who chose piece rate and tournament, 
respectively, separately for men and women. We first compare the performances in Tasks 1 and 
2. For both genders, we find that subjects who chose tournament performed better than those 
who chose piece rate; the only exception is men’s performance in the piece rate task. On the 
other hand, the improvement from the piece rate to the tournament task is largest for men who 
chose tournament. Thus, on average, women who chose tournament were better at solving math 
problems, but they did not significantly improve their results under competition. Although men 
who chose tournament were not significantly better than men who chose piece rate in Task 1, 
once being under competition, they significantly improved their results in Task 2.13 
 
Table 4. The average performance by choice of incentive scheme (standard deviations in 
parentheses)  
 Task 1 Task 2 Task 2- Task 1 Task 3 
 Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  
Choose 
piece rate 
8.96 
(3.24) 
9.37 
(3.34) 
9.18 
(2.98) 
10.17 
(3.50) 
0.22 
(2.11) 
0.81 
(2.30) 
9.30 
(3.16) 
10.34 
(3.26) 
Choose 
tournament 
9.42 
(3.400) 
10.59 
(3.78) 
10.29 
(3.39) 
11.19 
(3.74) 
0.87 
(2.33) 
0.59 
(2.45) 
10.56 
(3.55) 
10.98 
(3.34) 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum (p-
value) 
0.133 0.015 0.001 0.053 0.019 0.168 0.000 0.212 
 
For those who chose piece rate, there is no statistically significant difference in task 1 
performance (piece rate) between men and women (p-value=0.115), while women performed 
better in Task 2 (tournament) (p-value<0.001). Among those who chose tournament, women 
performed better than men in task 1 (p-value=0.028), while there is no statistically significant 
difference between men and women in task 2 (p-value=0.131). Finally, we can look at the 
performance in Task 3, where subjects performed either piece rate or tournament depending on 
their own choice (last two columns in Table 4). Men who chose to enter the tournament 
                                                        
13 For the subsample of subjects who chose tournament in Task 3, our results are in line with those by Gneezy et 
al. (2003) and Rustichini (2004), who found that men and boys, respectively, improved their performance when 
competing, while females and girls did not change their behavior from a non-competitive situation. 
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performed on average better than those who chose piece rate, but for women there are no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups. 
 
4.3 Explaining the difference in tournament entry  
Why were women more reluctant to choose tournament in Task 3, despite being, on average, 
slightly better than men? There could be many reasons for this, including a difference in 
confidence and risk preferences, but also other individual characteristics such as level of 
education and income. In order to investigate what affects the tendency to choose tournament, 
we estimate a binary probit model explaining the likelihood of tournament entry. Apart from 
including a variable measuring ability – performance in Task 2 – we investigate the explanatory 
power of confidence and risk preferences. Before presenting the results, we will therefore first 
look at confidence and risk. 
 
4.3.1 Confidence  
Confidence is one important factor that could influence the decision of whether to enter the 
tournament. In the experiment, subjects were asked to guess their rank in Tasks 1 and 2 (with 
1 being the best and 4 the worst) after they finished Task 3. We focus on the guess for Task 2 
here. The average guess for men was 2.3 and for women 2.4, and the difference in distributions 
is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.252). Figure 1 presents the distribution of guessed 
rank for Task 2. Most of the subjects guessed that their relative ranks were in the middle (rank 
2 or 3). The share of subjects guessing they were the top-performer is slightly higher for men.  
 
 
Figure 1. Guessed rank for Task 2 
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As can been seen in Table 5, the share of correct guesses for those who guessed they were 
ranked number one in their group in Task 2 is higher for women (9.9/14.6 = 68 %) than for men 
(9.3/21 = 44 %). Thus, there is some evidence of overconfidence for both men and women, but 
the magnitude of this belief is highest for men.14 
 
Table 5. Guessed and actual rank in Task 2 
 
Guessed 
rank 
Men´s actual rank Women´s actual rank 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1 9.3% 6.5% 4.0% 1.2% 9.9% 4.0% 0.7% 0.0% 
2 11.0% 10.0% 10.5% 6.8% 16.2% 13.4% 8.9% 5.6% 
3 3.7% 5.8% 8.9% 9.1% 5.9% 8.5% 6.8% 7.0% 
4 1.2% 1.9% 4.4% 5.6% 0.9% 2.8% 3.8% 5.6% 
 
4.3.2 Risk preferences  
Attitudes to risk is another potential determinant of the decision to choose tournament, yet 
previous findings are quite inconclusive in this regard (Buser et al., 2014; Kamas and Preston, 
2012; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). In this paper, we use the ratio between the certainty 
equivalent at the switching point and the expected value for each of the lotteries to measure 
subjects´ risk preferences. A ratio of the certainty equivalent to the expected value greater than 
one indicates that the subject is risk loving, while a ratio smaller than one indicates risk 
aversion. Table 6 shows that both men and women are, as expected, more risk loving at a lower 
probability of winning (10 %) and more risk averse at a higher probability level of winning (50 
and 90 %). Moreover, women are more risk averse than men for two of the three probability 
levels (50 and 90 %), but the differences are not sizeable in economic terms.  
 
  
                                                        
14  Another way to see this is to estimate a model on guessed rank in the tournament and control for both 
performance in Task 2 and gender. When we do this, both performance and gender are statistically significant, i.e., 
women are less likely than men to state a high rank. The estimated results are available upon request. 
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Table 6. Ratio between certainty equivalent and expected value at switching point in risk 
experiment; standard error in parentheses 
 
 Probability of winning 
 10% 50% 90% 
Men 3.22 
(2.47) 
1.25 
(0.42) 
1.02 
(0.16) 
Women 3.01 
(2.02) 
1.13 
(0.39) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value) 0.831 0.001 <0.001 
 
In Table A2 in the appendix, we report the results from a regression analysis for the risk 
experiment with a 50 % probability of winning (this is also the risk question we use in the 
following regression analyses), where we included individual and household characteristics. 
Importantly, what we find is that there is a statistically significant difference in risk preferences 
between men and women even when we control for characteristics such as income and parents´ 
education level.  
 
4.3.3 Regression results 
The results of a binary probit model, where the dependent variable is equal to one if the subject 
chose tournament in Task 3, are summarized in Table 7. We find that the size of the marginal 
effect for female subjects is stable and around -0.25 irrespective of the model specification, i.e., 
the fact that women are less likely to choose tournament in Task 3 holds also after including 
several controls. In addition, our measure of confidence, the guessed rank of own performance 
in Task 2, and risk preferences significantly explain the likelihood of choosing tournament: 
Those who thought they were ranked low and those who were more risk loving were more 
likely to choose the tournament in Task 3.15 Among the socio-economic variables, we find that 
having a university degree does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of choosing 
tournament, while having parents with a university degree increases this likelihood by eight 
percentage points. Being married is also positively associated with tournament entry, whereas 
being an only child does not have a significant effect.  
 
  
                                                        
15 We also ran regressions where we interacted being a woman with performance, guessed rank, and risk preference, 
respectively, but none of these interaction effects were significant. Results are available upon request.  
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Table 7. Probit model, the determinants of tournament entry; standard errors in parentheses 
 (1) 
Marginal 
effects 
(2)  
Marginal 
effects 
(3)  
Marginal 
effects 
(4)  
Marginal 
effects 
Female -0.247*** 
(0.031) 
-0.237*** 
(0.031) 
-0.224*** 
(0.032) 
-0.234*** 
(0.033) 
Performance in task 2 0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Guessed rank in task 2 
 
-0.078*** 
(0.020) 
-0.081*** 
(0.020) 
-0.073*** 
(0.021) 
Risk   0.130*** 
(0.040) 
0.145*** 
(0.041) 
Socio economic controls No No No Yes 
Regional controls No No No Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12 
Number of obs. 854 854 854 854 
Note: Socio-economic controls include age, having a university degree, working in the public sector, , being 
married, being an only child, having been at daycare as a child, parents being university educated, and income.  
  
 
5. Discussion 
By using the experimental design by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we investigate 
willingness to compete in a subject pool consisting of adults in three different provinces in 
China. Women are, on average, slightly better than men at the performance task of calculating 
the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers. Moreover, women improve their 
performance significantly more than men when the task is performed as a tournament rather 
than with a piece-rate payment structure. Strikingly, men are still more than twice as likely to 
enter a tournament, i.e., to choose to compete. On average, subjects who are more confident or 
risk loving are more likely to choose the tournament when offered a choice, but the gender 
difference in willingness to enter a tournament cannot be explained by differences in risk 
preferences or over-confidence.  
 
Our study contributes to and complements previous literature by investigating gender 
differences in a non-Western country by applying an experiment to an adult subject pool in 
China. As we have discussed, the Chinese case is particularly interesting to study since there 
are two opposing forces that might affect Chinese women´s willingness to compete. On one 
hand, the Chinese government has promoted gender equality for a long time and the gender gap 
in earnings is small in a cross-country comparison. On the other hand, China is in many respects 
still a patriarchal society, and some policies, notably the one-child policy, have affected gender 
equality negatively. The main findings from previous studies that women tend to shy away from 
competition are also found in our rather different setting, i.e., a country where women for many 
15 
 
decades have been part of the labor market to a greater extent than women in most other 
countries. This indicates that women´s unwillingness to compete is a robust finding across 
different countries and different government policies. Since China is a patriarchal society where 
men and boys are generally assigned a higher value than women and daughters, our results are 
also in line with those by Gneezy et al., (2009), who found that women were less willing to 
compete in patriarchal than in matrilineal societies. Thus, one possible explanation is that the 
patriarchal society model actually has had a stronger influence on women´s behavior than the 
official attempts by the Chinese government to promote women’s participation in the 
workforce. Thus, despite a number of policies promoting women’s educational attainment and 
workforce participation, the influence of other factors still result in stark differences between 
men and women when it comes to willingness to compete. 
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Appendix 1. Additional tables and figures 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of performance (number of correctly solved problems) by gender under 
piece rate. 
 
 
Figure A2. The distribution of performance by gender under tournament 
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Table A1. Average performance by gender and by province under piece rate and tournament; 
standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
Men Women 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test (p-value) 
 Guilin 
Piece rate 
8.926 
(3.401) 
9.069 
(3.490) 
0.644 
Tournament 
9.407 
(3.302) 
9.847 
(3.364) 
0.239 
Difference 0.480 
(0.159) 
0.778 
(0.155) 
0.074 
Number of obs. 204 203  
 Wuxi 
Piece rate 9.930 
(3.053) 
10.770 
(3.573) 
0.107 
Tournament 10.320 
(2.930) 
11.680 
(4.010) 
0.021 
Difference 0.390 
(2.183) 
0.910 
(2.575) 
0.130 
Number of obs. 100 100  
 Lanzhou 
Piece rate 8.911 
(3.291) 
9.561 
(3.092) 
0.085 
Tournament 9.516 
(3.217) 
10.187 
(3.248) 
0.071 
Difference 0.605 
(2.197) 
0.626 
(2.327) 
0.596 
Number of obs. 124 123  
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Table A2. Regression model on risk preferences; standard errors in parentheses. 
Variable Coefficient 
Female -0.121*** 
(0.028) 
Age  -0.015** 
(0.005) 
University degree -0.068** 
(0.030) 
Public sector -0.0002 
(0.031) 
Collective sector 0.097** 
(0.047) 
Married 0.002 
(0.036) 
One child 0.002 
(0.035) 
Income  -0.001 
(0.003) 
Parents have university degree -0.047 
(0.033) 
Wuxi 0.053 
(0.037) 
Lanzhou 0.002 
(0.033) 
Constant 1.758*** 
(0.174) 
Number of obs 854 
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 
 
 
 
